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The Story of a Forgotten Battle: Reviewing The Mormon 
Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth 
Century America 
 
Law libraries are generally boring places to outsiders (and to 
many insiders). Row upon row of identically bound books 
containing the arguments of long dead judges hardly make the blood 
boil or excite the imagination. Yet, a Latter-day Saint1 venturing into 
the volumes of United States Supreme Court decisions from the 
closing decades of the nineteenth century may well be surprised by 
what she finds. For example, in 1890 the Court suggested that The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“the Church”) was not 
entitled to constitutional protection because Mormonism was not 
really a religion.2 In another case, the Court held that states could 
(and they did) pass laws denying the vote to any who belonged to an 
organization that taught the doctrine of “celestial marriage.”3 Such 
cases are the dusty remains of the massive legal war waged by the 
federal government against the Church over the practice of plural 
marriage. As a Latter-day Saint, I had a visceral, tribal reaction when 
I first encountered these cases. Notwithstanding the passage of time 
and the Church’s change of practice,4 I felt betrayed by America and 
the Constitution. 
 
 1. Throughout this essay, I use the terms “Latter-day Saint,” “Mormon,” and “Saint” 
interchangeably. They all refer to a member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, known colloquially as “The Mormon Church” or “LDS Church.” Unlike Roman 
Catholic parlance, in Mormon terminology “Saint” does not denote any special spiritual merit, 
rather it is used in the New Testament sense to refer to any person baptized into the Church. 
See, e.g., Ephesians 2:19 (King James) (“Now therefore ye are no more strangers and 
foreigners, but fellowcitizens with the saints, and of the household of God.”). 
 2. See Late Corp. of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 
136 U.S. 1 (1890) (upholding the disincorporation of the Church under the Edmunds-Tucker 
Act). 
 3. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding an Idaho test oath for voters 
aimed at disenfranchising Mormons). 
 4. See THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS [hereinafter DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS], Official Declaration—1 
(1990) (renouncing plural marriage in 1890). This document is also known as the 
“Manifesto.” See id. 
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The scholarly treatment of the Church’s early legal struggles has 
been disappointing. While Mormon historians have frequently dealt 
with polygamy and anti-polygamy, they have written comparatively 
little on these subjects from a legal perspective.5 Law, it seems, has 
remained a relatively neglected field within Mormon studies, and 
legal scholars have had little interest in Mormon thought or 
experience. This is unfortunate because the legal history of the 
Church is a fascinating story that touches on many of the most 
fundamental questions in American jurisprudence. In particular, the 
legal war waged over polygamy was one of the titanic—and largely 
unstudied—struggles of American legal history. 
In The Mormon Question, Sarah Barringer Gordon tackles this 
particular story. Currently on the history and law faculties of the 
University of Pennsylvania, she specializes in the history of church-
state relations in nineteenth-century America. Although she has 
published articles related to Mormon history and church-state 
issues,6 The Mormon Question is her first book. It has three main 
strengths: It offers a much more nuanced and sympathetic portrayal 
of the ideology of anti-polygamist activists than one generally finds 
in Mormon history; it offers insights culled from the vast records of 
the Utah territorial courts; and it places the Supreme Court’s 
polygamy cases in their legal and historical contexts. 
Mormon writers have often described nineteenth-century anti-
polygamists in harsh terms, painting them as hypocrites more 
interested in scoring cheap political points than the earnest 
protectors of hearth and home they pretended to be. B.H. Roberts, a 
very influential Mormon intellectual and historian, summed up this 
view, writing in 1930 the following: 
Honorable individual exceptions to this arraignment of the anti-
“Mormon” “crusaders” are cheerfully and gladly conceded; but 
they are exceptions. For the rest, the indictment for hypocrisy, sex 
 
 5. There are, of course, important exceptions to this claim. See, e.g., EDWIN BROWN 
FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS (1988). 
 6. See, e.g., Sarah Barringer Gordon, “Our National Hearthstone”: Anti-Polygamy 
Fiction and the Sentimental Campaign Against Moral Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (1996); Sarah Barringer Gordon, “The Liberty of Self-Degradation”: 
Polygamy, Woman Suffrage, and Consent in Nineteenth-Century America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 815 
(1996). In addition, Mormon historians have used Gordon’s Ph.D. dissertation, “The Twin 
Relic of Barbarism”: A Legal History of Anti-Polygamy in Nineteenth Century America (1995) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with UMI Dissertation 
Services). See, e.g., DAVIS BITTON, GEORGE Q. CANNON: A BIOGRAPHY 123 (1999). 
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immorality, indifference to the purity of the home, on the part of 
the “crusaders,” stands. Their concern about the alleged evils of 
polygamy was mere pretense. 
 The real cause of this anti-“Mormon” crusade was a fight for the 
political control of Utah on the part of the “crusaders.” 7 
Modern Mormon historians may lack Roberts’s strident tone, but 
they often agree in substance with his views.8 Gordon, in contrast, 
argues that concern with polygamy was actually central to the federal 
government’s legal campaign against the Mormons and formed an 
important part of the ideology of the GOP politicians who 
dominated post–Civil War politics. 
According to Gordon, the roots of the crusade lie in the 
sentimental anti-polygamy novels of the 1850s and 1860s.9 Written 
by reform-minded, middle-class women, these novels portrayed 
polygamy as a barbaric and soul-destroying despotism. Often 
sensationalistic and having “little basis in fact,”10 they served an 
explicit political function. They were meant to excite their readers to 
action. Accordingly, they belong to the same genre as anti-slavery 
novels like Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which were meant to mobilize 
(Protestant) reformers into abolitionist politics.11 In this sense, 
whatever their limitations as literature or history, the anti-polygamy 
novels were wildly successful.  
The sentimental and reformist calls of the anti-polygamy novels 
combined with a Republican ideology, dominated by ideas of human 
progress and the social preconditions of democracy, to form a 
powerful and coherent attack on Mormons’ peculiar institution. In 
this “cosmology,” it was progress that had brought man to the point 
where he was fit for self-government. According to the anti-
polygamy theorists of the mid-nineteenth century, man had passed 
from a primordial sexual promiscuity, to an ancient polygamy, and 
 
 7. 6 B.H. ROBERTS, A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS CENTURY I, at 135 (1930) (emphasis in original). 
 8. See, e.g., FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 5, 210–60 (“The War on Mormon 
Society”). Firmage and Mangrum argue that anti-polygamy was secondary to the goal of 
dismantling the unique social and economic institutions of the Mormon commonwealth in the 
American West. 
 9. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 30 (2002). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
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finally, to modern monogamy.12 It went without saying, of course, 
that the movement was from bad to good, from barbarism to 
civilization. Thus, polygamy represented a form of sexual regression 
against the evolutionary progress of history. However, this was not 
all. It also rendered its practitioners unfit for the task of self-
government.13 Like slavery, polygamy produced a stagnant despotism 
inconsistent with the dynamism of a free and democratic society.14 
Accordingly, in the minds of anti-polygamy activists, Mormons could 
not be allowed to govern themselves until they had abandoned their 
“relic of barbarism” and progressed to the point already reached by 
the rest of the country.15 
Gordon chronicles the increasingly harsh measures that this 
ideology justified against Mormons. Beginning in the 1860s, 
successive Republican Congresses passed laws punishing polygamy in 
the territories. The pace and severity of these laws increased after the 
Civil War, as penalties were ratcheted up and procedures to facilitate 
conviction were devised.16 They finally culminated in a massive wave 
of prosecutions in the 1880s, the disincorporation of the Church, 
and the government’s confiscation of all of its assets. Gordon records 
that during the territorial period, the federal government prosecuted 
over two thousand criminal cases in Utah, and fully ninety-five 
percent of these were for sexual crimes—polygamy, unlawful 
cohabitation, and fornication.17 The sheer volume of prosecutions 
for sexual offenses, she notes, “is, literally, unique in American legal 
history, far exceeding, for example, that of seventeenth-century 
Massachusetts.”18 Virtually all of the prosecutions for sex crimes were 
tied to plural marriage. 
The massive scale of prosecutions resulted from two factors: the 
success of the Church’s leaders in evading arrest and the success of 
Mormon lawyers in defeating overreaching prosecutorial legal 
theories. Initially, federal officials hoped to crush plural marriage by 
imposing very long sentences on a few prominent leaders, such as 
members of the Church’s two governing councils, the First 
 
 12. Id. at 157. 
 13. Id. at 142. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 157. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 155. 
 18. Id. at 156. 
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Presidency and the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles.19 In order to do 
this, prosecutors first needed to catch the leaders and next persuade 
the courts to “segregate” offenses.20 Because of the difficulty of 
proving multiple marriage ceremonies, federal officials relied on the 
offense of unlawful cohabitation, the crime of actually living with 
more than one woman as a wife. Ingenious prosecutors piled on the 
punishment by segregating the offense temporally.21 Thus, Mormon 
Apostle Lorenzo Snow was prosecuted for three counts of unlawful 
cohabitation—one count for each of three successive years. In 
theory, the offenses could be infinitely segregated.22 For example, 
one year of plural marriage could be divided into 365 separate 
counts of unlawful cohabitation, one count for each day. This 
allowed prosecutors to pile very large fines and long prison sentences 
on targeted defendants. In effect, segregation transformed unlawful 
cohabitation, which was technically a minor misdemeanor, into a 
major criminal offense. However, Mormon success stymied the 
federal strategy. First, Mormon leaders went into the Underground, 
an elaborate system of safe houses and hiding places that allowed 
them to avoid arrest.23 Second, the Church’s lawyers succeeded in 
persuading the Supreme Court to strike down the practice of 
segregation.24 The federal prosecutors responded by shifting to a 
strategy of wider, but less dramatic, convictions. The result was an 
all-out effort to prosecute and jail every polygamist that federal 
marshals could arrest, regardless of prominence.25 
The Mormons responded by resisting. While most of the fighting 
involved “the bloodless tourney of lawyers,”26 Gordon notes that 
“some players descended into violence, as in 1885 when Sarah 
Nelson beat two deputies with a broomstick as they attempted to 
serve process on her husband’s other wives.”27 Most Mormons, 
however, resisted through perjury and concealment, many— 
 
 19. Id. at 158. 
 20. Id. at 152. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 159. 
 23. Id. at 158–59. 
 24. See In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887) (overturning the practice of segregating 
offenses). 
 25. GORDON, supra note 9, at 160. 
 26. Id. at 156. 
 27. Id. 
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especially women—being sent to prison for contempt of court when 
they refused to answer questions implicating family members and 
fellow Saints.28 
Gordon also documents how Mormon resistance frustrated anti-
polygamists, who responded with harsher legislation.29 In addition, 
the legalization of the anti-polygamy movement in the late 1870s 
and especially in the 1880s marked a masculinization of the process. 
While the chief figures in anti-polygamy politics during the 1850s 
and 1860s had been female novelists and lecturers, in the 1870s and 
1880s these women were increasingly marginalized, as male 
legislators, lawyers, and judges emerged as the key players. Also, as it 
became apparent that Latter-day Saint women were partners in 
resistance—rather than the imagined passive victims of domineering 
and lascivious Mormon patriarchs—sympathy for them among 
eastern anti-polygamists faded, reinforcing a harsher, more punitive 
attitude.30 Thus, the political support for the Edmunds-Tucker Act—
which disincorporated the Church and confiscated its property—was 
generated in part by the fortitude of the Mormon response to federal 
prosecutions.31 Yet despite the ultimately self-defeating logic of 
Mormon resistance, Gordon praises the political and legal 
sophistication of the polygamist resisters.32 Indeed, despite continual 
legislative defeats from 1882 on, Mormon lawyers were able to score 
some notable victories in court and, at the very least, forced federal 
attorneys to fight for each conviction. 
Gordon’s book shines brightest in its treatment of the cases that 
the Church fought to the Supreme Court. Her discussion of the 
landmark decision in Reynolds v. United States33 provides an example 
of her analysis. The Reynolds decision, handed down in 1879, is 
generally acknowledged as a seminal case because, for the first time, 
the Supreme Court positively interpreted the content of the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses. The traditional account of Reynolds 
can be summarized in this way: In the mid-1870s, Mormon leaders 
decided to test the constitutional validity of anti-polygamy laws.34 
 
 28. Id. at 161. 
 29. Id. at 164–66. 
 30. Id. at 149, 181. 
 31. Id. at 164–66. 
 32. Id. at 155. 
 33. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
 34. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 5, at 151. 
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George Reynolds provided the information necessary to convict 
himself, appealed to the Supreme Court, and argued that the law 
violated his right to the free exercise of his religion.35 The Court 
responded by ruling that the term “Free Exercise” in the First 
Amendment referred to only religious belief and did not cover 
religious action.36 
According to Gordon, this account is overly simplistic and largely 
misses the main issues in the case. She argues that Reynolds was not 
simply a “test-case” in which the Mormons turned to the courts for 
protection. Rather, it was part of a broader political strategy aimed 
primarily at Congress. George Q. Cannon, a member of the 
Church’s governing First Presidency who also served as Utah’s 
delegate to the House of Representatives, instigated the suit as part 
of a “costly strategy . . . to turn to law in the hope of tying up 
Republicans in the tangles of Supreme Court doctrine.”37 In fact, 
prior to Reynolds there had been no polygamy convictions for the 
simple reason that proving polygamous marriages was nearly 
impossible.38 It was only after the Court’s decision that Congress 
responded with unlawful cohabitation statutes that allowed, for the 
first time, wholesale prosecution of polygamists. Thus, Reynolds was 
aimed not at halting federal law enforcement but at providing 
Cannon with constitutional arguments that he could use with 
political fence-sitters in Congress.39 Ultimately, Cannon’s strategy 
backfired not only because it cleared the constitutional road for 
convictions but also because it provided the political impetus to pass 
laws facilitating them.40 
Gordon also attacks the simple jurisprudential account of the 
traditional Reynolds story. She notes that Reynolds’s attorneys 
actually directed most of their attention not to the First Amendment 
but to the continuing vitality of the Dred Scott41 decision.42 In Dred 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 155. 
 37. GORDON, supra note 9, at 149. 
 38. See FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 5, at 149–51 (discussing early prosecutions 
against polygamists). 
 39. GORDON, supra note 9, at 149. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 42. Gordon, however, is not the first writer to notice the role of Dred Scott in the 
Reynolds case. See Randall D. Guynn & Gene C. Schaerr, The Mormon Polygamy Cases, 
SUNSTONE, Sept. 1987, at 8, 9–10. 
OMAN-FIN 9/30/2002  10:13 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
752 
Scott the Supreme Court overturned the Missouri Compromise (and 
by implication the Compromise of 1850), holding that the federal 
government could not forbid slavery in the territories.43 Many 
modern lawyers assume that the Civil War amendments outlawing 
slavery and granting constitutional protection to freed slaves 
overturned Dred Scott, eviscerating any precedential value it might 
have.44 However, as Gordon demonstrates, in the years following the 
Civil War many lawyers assumed that while the Thirteenth 
Amendment banned slavery, Dred Scott continued to be good law to 
the extent that it limited the power of the federal government to 
regulate “domestic” issues in the territories.45 The traditional 
account of Reynolds thus assumes—mistakenly—that the federal 
government had an unquestioned right to legislate for the territories 
and that the only issue was whether the First Amendment protected 
polygamy. In reality, the power of the federal government over the 
territories was still an open question in 1879, and notwithstanding 
the Court’s silent rejection of his arguments, Reynolds had good 
reasons for believing that Congress did not have the power to 
legislate on “domestic” issues such as marriage. 
Gordon’s account also suggests that Reynolds presented an 
Establishment Clause argument as much as a Free Exercise Clause 
argument. Today, at least in part because of the Reynolds decision, 
lawyers tend to think of the First Amendment’s religion clauses as 
two parts of a single national law of religion. Simply stated, the Free 
Exercise Clause protects private religious conduct from the 
government, while the Establishment Clause forbids religious activity 
by the state. Gordon, however, shows that imposing such an 
understanding on the Reynolds decision is anachronistic. During the 
nineteenth century, lawyers conceptualized the religion clauses in 
terms of jurisdiction.46 The First Amendment allocated power over 
religion by forbidding any federal action on the issue. The Mormons 
argued in effect that these limitations protected local autonomy in 
matters of faith. Because Mormonism was, in a sense, the  
 
 
 43. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452 (“[I]t is the opinion of the court that [the Missouri 
Compromise] . . . is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void.”). 
 44. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309 n.19 (3d 
ed. 2000) (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment reversed Dred Scott). 
 45. GORDON, supra note 9, at 124. 
 46. Id. at 6–7. 
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“established” church in Utah, the federal government was forbidden 
from intervening with it through anti-polygamy legislation.47 
The Court brushed all of these issues aside through a simple 
move: it used state law to interpret the federal constitution. Thus, 
rather than viewing the First Amendment as allocating power over 
religion to various levels of government, the Court analogized the 
First Amendment to early legislation in Virginia sponsored by 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.48 This legislation had 
provided for some measure of local religious toleration and had 
weakened the established Episcopal Church in Virginia.49 The Court 
then applied this analysis to the First Amendment, arguing that it 
too was a general mandate of religious toleration. Having created a 
substantive rather than jurisdictional law of religion using the First 
Amendment, the Court ruled that this national law provided no 
protection for the practice of (as opposed to belief in) plural 
marriage.50 “This jurisprudential sleight of hand substituted the 
democratic experience of one jurisdiction—Virginia—for a process 
that would have allowed each jurisdiction to determine for itself the 
meaning and scope of the law of religion within its boundaries. This 
substitution was profoundly nationalizing.”51 
Gordon also, almost grudgingly, acknowledges that “prejudice 
against Mormons and their alternative faith played a role in the 
decision.”52 She notes that the Court used racist arguments to 
support its conclusion, placing the Mormons outside of its nationally 
homogenous sphere of protection in part by analogizing them to 
“the Asiatic and . . . African people.”53 Both of these groups, in turn, 
were identified in the nineteenth-century white American 
imagination with sexual immorality and anti-democratic indolence. 
The Court thus implied that Mormons shared what one nineteenth-
century writer called the “[Negroes’] ungovernable propensity to 
miscellaneous sexual indulgence”54 and the supposed Asiatic 
predilection for despotism. 
 
 47. See id. at 5. 
 48. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–63 (1879). 
 49. Id. at 163. 
 50. Id. at 164–65. 
 51. GORDON, supra note 9, at 134. 
 52. Id. at 142. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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On the whole, this is an excellent book. I would have enjoyed a 
more detailed, blow-by-blow account of the legal maneuverings and 
more of Gordon’s close analysis of judicial decisions. Others may 
wish that the discussion of anti-polygamy fiction were longer. This 
tension, however, is inherent to legal history. For many years, Anglo-
American legal historians wrote about the law as though it were a 
self-contained social phenomenon. Their work tended to focus 
almost exclusively on the development of legal doctrine, with 
occasional side notes on the life of the bench and bar.55 In response 
to this insularity, modern legal historians have focused on the ways in 
which the law reflects and interacts with its social context.56 On this 
spectrum, Gordon has put more weight on the social side and less on 
the legal side of the scale. 
The Mormon Question contains possibilities for a broad range of 
scholars. Those interested in the politics of marriage in the 
nineteenth century will be intrigued by Gordon’s description of the 
intersection of sexual, familial, and political ideology in the anti-
polygamy crusade. Scholars interested in church-state issues will 
appreciate her nuanced legal account of what was the largest, 
longest, and most intense confrontation between law and religion in 
American history. In addition, she offers a fascinating story of how 
faith, politics, and the law can interact to create new bodies of legal 
precedent and transform religious practices. Finally, Gordon’s book 
should appeal to another group: Latter-day Saint legal scholars and 
those interested in Mormonism’s relation to law. 
Hitherto, Mormonism as a potential perspective on the law has 
been relatively invisible in the legal academy.57 This is unfortunate 
 
 55. Professor Lawrence Friedman of Stanford Law School has graphically characterized 
the early stages of American legal historiography: 
Legal scholars and lawyers were interested in precedents, but not in history; they 
twisted and used the past, but rarely treated it with the rigor that history demands. 
Historians, for their part, were not aware of the richness and importance of legal 
history; the lawyers, jealous of their area showed them only a dreary battlefield of 
concepts; historians were unwelcome there; the landscape was technical and strewn 
with corpses and mines. 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 11–12 (2d ed. 1985). 
 56. For an influential example of this modern approach, see MORTON HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1977). 
 57. But see Kif Augustine-Adams, The Web of Membership: The Consonance and Conflict 
of Being American and Latter-day Saint, 13 J.L. & RELIGION 567 (1999); Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 167 (1992); James T. McHugh, A Liberal Theocracy: Philosophy, Theology, and Utah 
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given the Latter-day Saints’ fascinating legal history, and the 
presence of other religious perspectives within legal scholarship.58 
Gordon’s book, however, provides a useful place to begin for 
scholars interested in offering such a perspective. The value of such a 
perspective lies not only in the increasing demographic and political 
significance of Mormonism,59 but also in the possibility that it may 
offer unique insights on persistent issues.60 
Reflection on the legal storm recorded by Gordon gives Latter-
day Saint scholars two valuable opportunities. First, the tenacity and 
commitment of nineteenth-century Mormons, which Gordon 
details, provide a powerful reminder of the importance of this period 
for modern Latter-day Saints. As Mormon novelist and essayist 
Orson Scott Card has written: 
Mormons still treasure the myth of persecution: abuse a Mormon 
because of his beliefs, and he is almost grateful for the chance to 
bravely resist you, for it proves that he is worthy of the sacrifices of 
his ancestors. Polygamy named us as a people, and though  
 
 
Constitutional Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1515 (1997); Cheryl B. Preston, Feminism and Faith: 
Reflections on the Mormon Heavenly Mother, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 337 (1993). 
 58. See, e.g., R.J. Aranjo, Thomas Aquinas: Prudence, Justice, and the Law, 40 LOY. L. 
REV. 897 (1995) (Catholic); Harold J. Berman, The Spiritualization of Secular Law: The 
Impact of the Lutheran Reformation, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 313 (2000) (Protestant); David A. 
Funk, Traditional Islamic Jurisprudence: Justifying Islamic Law and Government, 20 S.U. L. 
REV. 213 (1993) (Islamic); Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to 
the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813 
(1993) (Jewish). 
 59. With 4.9 million American adherents, Mormonism is now one of the six or seven 
largest religious groups in the country. THE WORLD BOOK ALMANAC 2001 at 689 (William A. 
McGeverran ed., 2001). By contrast there are about 4.1 million Jews in the United States and 
2.3 million Episcopalians. Id. The largest single religious group in the United States is the 
Roman Catholic church with 62 million members. Id. at 690. However, demographic trends 
indicate that Mormonism is fated to be much more than simply a sizeable religious minority in 
the United States. Assuming that LDS growth rates remain constant into the next century, 
there will be 100 million Mormons worldwide by 2040. See Tim B. Heaton, Vital Statistics, 4 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM 1518, 1520 (Victor Ludlow ed., 1992). Given the 
possibility of this kind of future growth, sociologist Rodney Stark argues that in Mormonism 
we are witnessing one of the rare events in human history: the rise of a new world religion. See 
Rodney Stark, The Rise of a New World Faith, 26 REV. REL. RES. 18 (1984). 
 60. See, e.g., Drew Clark, The Mormon Stem-Cell Choir, SLATE, Aug. 3, 2001, at 
http://slate.msn.com/?id=112974 (visited on December 12, 2001) (detailing the way in 
which LDS theology allowed Mormon senators to broker a compromise on stem-cell 
research). An informal measure of the potential interest of such a perspective is the fact that 
this article generated more email responses than any other recent Slate article. Interview with 
Drew Clark (Aug. 25, 2002). 
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polygamy is gratefully behind us now, we still live on the strength 
of its legacy.61 
To her credit, Gordon has the sensitivity to understand this, 
writing that the “loss of the battle for polygamy was bitter and still 
resonates in Mormons’ historical scholarship. The authority of the 
Constitution . . . reflected the interest of the enemies of Zion.”62 
Thus, despite the oft repeated identification of Mormonism as the 
quintessentially “American religion,”63 the relationship of the Saints 
to the legal ideology of the United States is ambiguous. It is worth 
remembering that at the supreme moment of confrontation between 
Mormonism and the state, the Constitution and its institutions failed 
the Saints. Ironically, this is something that many American Latter-
day Saints, who take an unabashedly triumphalist attitude towards 
the Constitution, seem to have forgotten.64 
Second, the ultimate failure of the Constitution to protect the 
Mormon Zion from her attackers gives Latter-day Saints a unique 
position from which to critically explore the current legal system, 
even while Mormon theology forecloses a complete break with 
constituted legal authority.65 Mormons today tend to place almost 
exclusive emphasis on “being subject to kings, presidents, rulers, and 
magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and sustaining the law.”66 
Gordon’s work, however, provides a powerful reminder that there 
are other possibilities within Mormon theology and experience. 
Confronting the tenacious, powerful, and at times radical arguments 
offered by Mormonism’s legal defenders in the nineteenth century 
contains a promise for Latter-day Saints who care about 
 
 61. ORSON SCOTT CARD, SAINTS 627 (1984). 
 62. GORDON, supra note 9, at 222. 
 63. See, e.g., HAROLD BLOOM, THE AMERICAN RELIGION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
POST-CHRISTIAN NATION 77–128 (1992). For Bloom, there is “The American Religion”—a 
single form of Gnostic spirituality native to the United States—of which Mormonism is the 
quintessential expression. 
 64. But see R. Collin Mangrum, Mormonism, Philosophical Liberalism, and the 
Constitution, BYU STUD., Summer 1987, at 119. Writing during the celebration of the 
Constitution’s Bicentennial, Mangrum, after noting the historically shabby treatment of 
Mormons and their values by the Constitution, posed the question: “Why then Mormon 
hoopla over what could be characterized as political degeneracy?” Id. at 119. Mangrum goes 
on to argue that the answer to this question can be found in the congruence of Mormon 
theology with the classical liberal political ideas embodied in the Constitution. Id. 
 65. See DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS, supra note 4, § 134; The Articles of Faith of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, in THE PEARL OF GREAT PRICE ¶ 12 (1990). 
 66. Id. 
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jurisprudence in the twenty-first century. Law requires that we work 
out the limits of collective, government authority and the strength of 
the claims of faith to individual and communal self-definition. This 
constant negotiation and confrontation between God and Caesar is a 
central question of legal theory. Gordon’s book illustrates 
Mormonism’s past ability to provide valuable perspectives on that 
question, perspectives that powerfully question the law’s claims to 
authority. More generally, her work suggests that Mormon thought 
and experience contain rich opportunities for Latter-day Saints who 
have the luxury of thinking about such problems in less troubled 
times.67 
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 67. Fortunately, there seems to be a recent increase in interest in discussions of law and 
Mormonism. BYU Law School’s J. Reuben Clark Society hosted a conference in October 2001 
on “LDS Perspectives on the Law.” See generally the articles forthcoming in the 2003 
Brigham Young University Law Review. In addition, Latter-day Saint legal scholars interested 
in using their religion as a lens for the study of the law can look to recent examples by 
traditional Christian scholars. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE 
RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993); CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL 
THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001). 
∗ Nathan B. Oman (noman@law.harvard.edu) is an Articles Editor on the Harvard Law 
Review. He also moderates an email discussion list (ldslaw@lists.law.harvard.edu) hosted by 
Harvard Law School on the topic of law and Mormonism. The author would like to thank 
Allison Tirres and Frederick M. Gedicks for commenting on an earlier draft of this review. All 
the standard disclaimers apply. 
OMAN-FIN 9/30/2002  10:13 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
758 
 
